And what of the explanations? How did we arrive at this situation? Many explanations consider both internal and external factors though in a globalised world many of these have become increasingly related as inter-state conflict usually has international ramifications such as refugee flows; for our purposes breaking explanations down into internal/external makes this task easier to handle.

The internal explanations include those of either grievance or greed. The grievances may be economic with war as a response to economic decline and poverty. Specifically, young people with no jobs may feel angry and motivated by grievance to resort to conflict.  Alternately, greed explanations pertain to ‘war as business’ in which war is the rational creation of groups wishing to benefit from the war economy. It is “the continuation of economics by other means” in which winning in the conventional sense is less important than profiting.[3]

The greed explanations point to the prevalence of looting in these conflicts and struggles for control over valuable resources e.g. diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Another internal explanation pertains to the cultural and would argue that conflict is due to the existence of repressed ‘ancient hatreds’ which never truly disappeared. Samuel Huntington (1996) similarly argues that the conflicts of the future will be about culture rather than ideology.[4] While in the case of Rwanda this may sound convincing it completely ignores other important factors such as growing poverty and persistent underdevelopment.

The international explanations stress the emergence of these conflicts in the post Cold War era and the resulting collapse of international finance which meant fewer resources available for clientelist practices. This is argued by Chabal and Daloz (1999) who believe conflict was sparked by the breakdown of patrimonial systems which were responsible for generating authority and support in African states.[5] The more recent developments in conflict literature perhaps seek to reconcile the internal and external factors by arguing the centrality of the African state in explaining conflict. These state based explanations vary considerably.

Chris Allen (1999) perceives conflict as the result of ‘spoils politics’ whereby violence becomes intensified as elites try to hold onto control of the state apparatus for the purposes of personal enrichment. Ethnicity may be used as a mobilising factor which can lead to instability. In the end as a result of ‘spoils politics’ the state may become so weak that it will implode; meaning that it ceases to exercise authority. Alternately, it may explode in which the regime is replaced by warring factions.[6] In a roundabout way therefore, conflict is a result of the weak state.

Mary Kaldor (2007) argues that states are weak because of the economic impact of globalisation. This has caused a decline of state authority and the erosion of economic and social security; therefore these ‘new wars’ are the result of the disintegration of the state.[7] Herbst (2000) however offers a rather radical perspective in that the weak state is the result of low population density.

Finally, Richard Jackson (2002) whose analysis we are most interested in believes civil war is not the result of a breakdown in an otherwise peaceful order but rooted in structures and processes of the weak state which is a non-consolidated democracy.  His explanation of the features of the weak state cover the political, economic and social. They are:

“institutional weakness, economic scar-city, problems of legitimacy, political instability, lack of national identity, failure to secure the hegemonic idea of the state, and external vulnerability” [8]

What is the relationship between these features and conflict? Richard Jackson (2002) links the weak state with elites and economics explaining that conflict is often a rational strategy by elites trying to hold onto power and prompted to do so by the decline of resources for patrimonialism and the pressures of globalisation. With few resources the most obvious choice is to utilise existing ethnic identities; this can lead to politics divided along ethnic lines with different ethnic groups competing for power which significantly raises the stakes of obtaining power.[9]

As most African states can be deemed ‘weak states’ and if conflict, and civil war specifically, are the result of the weak state is it not then inevitable?

In short, the answer is no. The ‘prevention is better than cure’ argument appears convincing in so far that it is better to prevent conflict before it emerges through the use of diplomacy e.g. peacekeeping, disarmament, etc. This is preferable as once a weak state does become engaged in conflict it is very difficult to solve as violence tends to intensify. To resolve a conflict once underway much is required including ‘demobilisation, demilitarisation, economic and social reconstruction’ in short getting to the root of the problem and reconstructing the state itself.[10] It is necessary to build state institutions to transform it from a weak state into a strong state.

The approach thus far however of western governments in propping up weak states may be counter-productive as unless a weak state makes a transition to a strong one then there is likely at some point to be the continuation of conflict; especially as it requires a reliance on internal actors who are hardly committed to democratic principles.[11] However the weak state framework of Jackson (2002) and similar analyses from others (Allen, 1999)  do not posit that conflict nor conflict resolution are inevitable. They do however require a better understanding of the causes as well as the sharing of power by elites and the adoption of democratic reforms, institution building, strengthening civil society, creation of a system of checks and balances.[12]

Ultimately, while conflict is not inevitable it is a likely possibility for any weak African state; the chances of which would be greatly diminished with successful democratic consolidation.

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